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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE N. ANDERSON and wife, 
IMOGENE T. ANDERSON, LORENZO W. 
ANDERSON, heretofore known as LORENZO 
W. ANDERSON, JR., and wife HAZEL 
M. ANDERSON, 
. vs. 
MARIE T. JOHNSON and 
CHESTER N. JOHNSON, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Two matters are involved in this appeal. The first 
relates to the claimed error on the part of the court in 
granting a motion for a change of venue and transferring 
the cause from Box Elder County, the residence of de-
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fendants, .to Cache County for trial. The other question 
involves alleged errors in the trial itself. For the sake of 
clarity, we are, therefore, discussing first the matters 
relating to the change of venue, after which we will dis-
cuss the so-called merits on appeal. 
This case was filed in Box Elder County, the resi-
dence of the defendants and also the county in which 
the land is situated. The case was previously tried in Box 
Elder County and a verdict returned in favor of the de-
fendants. On appeal to this court the verdict was reversed 
for the reason that the trial court incorrectly construed 
the so-called dead man's statute and the case was sent 
'back for a new trial. 
On July 31, 1952 the plaintiff filed a notice and 
motion for change of venue. The motion was supported 
by an affid~vit signed by the plaintiffs and also an affi-
davit of Walter G. Mann, their attorney. Counter affida-
vits were filed by the defendants. Judge Jones requested 
Judge Jeppson of the third district to hear the motion for 
change of venue. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, 
Judge Jeppson entered an oral order granting the motion 
and ordering the case transferred to Cache County. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
WITH REFERENCE TO THE CHANGE OF 
VENUE UPON WHICH DEFENDANTS RELY 
FOR A REVERSAL OF THIS CAUSE. 
Point I. The order transferring the trial from Box 
Elder County to Cache County is erroneous and void 
because: 
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A. No valid judgment was entered herein trans-
ferring said cause. 
B. The evidence does not support the judgment or 
minute entry, if such constitutes a valid order of 
judgment, granting plaintiffs' motion for change 
of venue. 
We shall discuss these matters in the order sug-
gested. 
A. As previously noted, Judge Jones disqualified 
himself and requested Judge Jeppson of the third district 
to hear the motion, which was heard on August 12, 1952. 
At the conclusion of the hearing Judge Jeppson entered 
an oral decision granting the motion. See transcript on 
hearing for change of venue, Page 77. See also minute 
book 23, Page 95, Tr. 22. Thereafter, on August 20, 1952, 
Judge Jones, who had not participated in the hearing, 
entered a written order in the form of a judgment grant-
ing the motion and ordering the trial to be held in Cache 
County and directing the Clerk to transmit the files to 
the Clerk of said County. Tr. 23. 
We contend that the written order entered by Judge 
Jones is a nullity. It is the same as though one judge of a 
district court presided at the trial of a cause and then 
another district judge thereafter entered and signed find-
ings and judgment. Rule 58 (b) provides: 
"Except as provided in subdivision (a) hereof and 
subdivision (b) (I) of Rule 55, all judgments shall 
be signed by the judge and filed with the clerk." 
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The term "the judge" as used in this rule clearly means 
the judge who heard the cause. Rule 63 provides in effect 
that in the event of disability or disqualification of a 
judge before whom an action has been tried rendering 
him unable to perform his duties, after a verdict is re-
turned or findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, 
then another judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the 
court in which the action was tried may perform those 
duties, or he may grant a new trial. 
It is not contended that Judge Jeppson was disquali-
fied. The only question, therefore, is whether or not a 
written j.udgment in the form signed by Judge Jones, but 
which should have been signed by Judge Jeppson, was 
necessary in order to make the change of venue valid. 
We contend that such a judgment is necessary and evi-
dently counsel for plaintiffs so construed the rules. 
Rule 54 (a) defines a judgment as used in the rules 
to include "a decree and any order from which an appeal 
lies." 
It has been repeatedly been held by this court that 
an order granting or denying a motion for change of 
venue is an appealable order. 
Buckle vs. Ogden Furniture 
61 Utah, 559 
216 Pac., 684 
Cox vs. Dixie Power 
72 Utah, 236 
269 Pac., 100 
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Hale vs. Barker 
70 Utah, 284 
259 Pac., 1928 
Schramm Johnson Drug Company vs. Cox 
79' Utah, 276 
9 P 2nd., 399 
If, therefore, the order transferring the case for trial is a 
judgment within the definition of Rule 54, then under 
Rule 58 (b) it must be signed by the judge (meaning of 
course Judge Jeppson) and filed with the Clerk. It was 
reversible error for the files to have been transferred to 
Cache County without such a judgment being entered 
herein. 
B. The evidence does not support the minute entry 
granting the change of venue and ordering the case 
transferred to Cache County for trial. Plaintiffs filed 
their motion pursuant to the provisions of Section 78-
13-9, Subdivision (2) which provides: 
"The court may, on motion, change the place of 
trial in the following cases: **** (2) when there 
is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot 
be had in the county designated in the complaint." 
The motion was supported by only two affidavits: 
(a) Affidavit of the plain tiffs, and 
(b) Affidavit of counsel. 
While the affidavits attempted to set forth several 
grounds; namely, many relatives, prior employment, etc., 
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yet the court granted the order solely on the ground 
with reference to the subject of communism. Tr. 78. Let 
us then examine the evidence relating to this subject as 
contained in the transcript of the evidence: 
Plaintiff's affidavit stated merely that the defendant, 
Marie T. Johnson had maliciously spread rumors that 
plaintiff, George N. Anderson and his wife were Com-
munists and that said false statements had been widely 
scattered in Box Elder County. The affidavit of counsel 
merely stated that on an occasion a neighbor of Marie 
Johnson accosted him in a grocery store and m~de some 
disparaging remarks about him if he undertook to rep-
resent the plaintiffs. 
Defendant Marie Johnson filed a counter affidavit 
in which, among other things, she denied positively that 
she had made any such charges and denied that any pre-
judice existed in Box Elder County against the plaintiffs 
to her knowledge. She further alleged that Box Elder 
County was .the second largest county in the State of 
Utah; that there are approximately twenty thousand resi-
dents therein; that in her opinion no prejudice existed in 
Box Elder County which would prevent plaintiffs from 
having a fair and impartial trial. The matters set forth 
in plaintiff's affidavit having been denied by defendants, 
this then formed the issue to be heard and tried by the 
court. That issue was whether or not there was reason to 
believe that an impartial trial could not be had in Box 
Elder County, by reason of the alleged rumors that Plain-
tiff Anderson was a Communist, or sympathetic with 
communism. 
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Plaintiff George N. Anderson was then called as a 
witness to testify in support of his motion. He testified 
generally as to various and sundry towns and cities scat-
tered throughout Box Elder County with respect to his 
relatives and his acquaintances generally. He inferred 
that because of numerous relatives and the fact that he 
had previously worked for the United States Government 
a number of years ago in the relief department, that there 
were people who disliked him. However, the court did not 
base its decision upon any of these matters but granted 
the motion solely on the question of alleged communistic 
influences. Plaintiff in his testimony in chief never even 
mentioned the word communism and the only time the 
subject was mentioned is found on Page 72 of the tran-
script in ansper to questions propounded by the court 
himself, wherein, over defendants' objection, the court 
permitted the plaintiff to state that in talking to two of 
the former jurors in the trial he obtained certain infor-
mation. The court asked him what the jurors told him 
and he answered: 
"Mr. Beecher told me that he understood from 
what my sister was telling around town that I was 
a Communist. Therefore, he had no sympathy 
with me on the trial." 
The defendants emphatically denied that they had ever 
spread such rumors. 
The issue which the trial court was called upon to 
decide was whether or not there existed in fact bias and 
prejudice in the minds of the citizenry of Box Elder 
County by reason of rumored communistic affiliations by 
7. 
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one of the plaintiffs which would prevent plaintiffs from 
having a fair and impartial trial. The evidence disclosed, 
and this court judicially knows, that Box Elder County 
is the second largest county territorily in the State of 
Utah. The evidence further shows, and this court judi-
cially knows, that there are many cities and towns in Box 
Elder County; that the county has a population of 
approximately twenty thousand people disbursed over a 
very large area and that prospective jurors are drawn from 
these various towns or territories. Not one witness was 
called except plaintiff himself to testify, nor were there 
any affidavits presented from any one other than plain-
tiff or his counsel. If any such rumors existed there cer-
tainly was a complete lack of evidence to sustain the 
- same. Plaintiff himself was permitted, over defendants' 
objections, to answer the following question: 
"THE COURT: ****You can ask him about the 
general reputation." 
"Q. Do you feel that your reputation in Box Elder 
County is such that it would prejudice you 
for a fair trial?" 
"THE COURT: I'll let him answer. I don't think 
it's worth much. You might ask him in detail 
what ihis reputation is. He can answer that ques-
tion as to whether he thinks it would hurt him, 
but I don't think it's of much weight, because it's 
I . '' a cone us1on. 
"Q. Do you think it would hurt you?" 
"A. I think my reputation is both good and bad 
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in the county. I have held some rather high and 
responsible positions and I've done a lot of com-
munity organizing activities during the war which 
I think were beneficial and which brought a great 
deal of praise from people in different parts of the 
county; and, as I say, I've dealt with other people 
who definitely don't like me. I do think my repu-
tation has deteriorated since I left here, among 
my close friends." 
This is the first time the writer has ever participated 
in a motion for change of venue where affidavits have 
not been procured or witnesses produced from various 
and sundry citizens residing in various parts of the county 
stating facts upon which a court could draw the infer-
ence that there probably does exist a bias or prejudice 
among the citizens generally which would preclude the 
movant from having a fair trial. Can it be said that there 
is any substantial evidence that rumors of communistic 
affiliations do exist without producing any evidence from 
citizens or prospective jurors to the effect that such ru-
mors are in fact circulating in and about the county? Can 
a plaintiff himself merely say that he doesn't believe that 
he can have a fair trial by reason of bias and prejudice 
alleged to exist in the county against him without any 
evidence whatsoever to support his opinion? The only 
reference to alleged communistic influence was the refer-
ence to what the juror Beecher is represented to have told 
plaintiff after the first trial, but even this juror Beecher 
was not called as a witness. It was at most a mere hearsay 
declaration on the part of the plaintiff and certainly what 
Beecher said did not prove in any way that there was bias 
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or prejudice existing in the mind of the public generally. 
If such a statement was made by the juror Beecher and 
if it is admissible in evidence, Beecher would be the proper 
person to call as a witness to testify to those facts or to 
what he knew about the matter. Nor do we think it was 
proper to admit this testimony. It is against public policy 
and an interference with the orderly conduct of trial to 
permit jurors to reveal what is said in a jury room. 
Wheat vs. D. & R. G. 
250 P. 2nd., 932 
Hepworth vs. Covey Bros. Amusement Company 
97 Utah, 205 
91 P. 2nd., 507 
But even though admissible, it amounted only to this: 
That ·a juror in explaining his verdict said he understood 
from what my sister was telling around town that I was 
a Communist. No contention was made that the matter 
was discussed in the jury room. From- all that appears, the 
juror Beecher is alleged to have claimed that he had heard 
some rumors to the effect that the defendant had told 
around Brigham City, which is only a small segment of 
Box Elder County, that the plaintiff was a Communist. 
This I might have disqualified Beecher as a juror if he 
were recalled to jury duty but it certainly fell far short of 
proving that there did in fact exist in Box Elder County 
a bias or prejudice against the plaintiff. 
In fairness to the sister, Mrs. Johnson, may I again 
refer to the fact that she denied ever having made any 
such statement to any person whatsoever and I think it is 
10 
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fair to assert that the sister does not believe for a minute 
that her brother is either affiliated with or has any com-
munistic beliefs. 
If a court can grant a motion for a change of venue 
on such flimsy evidence as was presented in this case, 
then the defendants' statutory right to be tried in the 
county of his or her residence might just as well be abro-
gated. The right of the defendants to be tried in the 
county of his or her residence is a very substantial right 
and this court has repeatedly held that the denial of this 
right constitutes prejudicial error. See cases above re-
ferred to. 
We contend, therefore, that the granting of the mo-
tion for change of venue is not supported by any com-
petent material evidence and also that the failure of the 
court to enter a written judgment both constituted revers-
ible error in this case. We further contend that for these 
reasons alone this cause should be reversed and the Clerk 
of Cache County be directed to return the files to Box 
Elder County for a new trial. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON THE MERITS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are not disputed: Lorenzo W. 
Anderson, now deceased, is the Father of plaintiffs George 
N. Anderson and Lorenzo W. Anderson, Jr. <hereinafter 
referred to as "Renee") and the defendant Marie T. John-
son. His wife died in about the year 1937 and he never 
remarried. Except for the conveyances hereinafter referred 
to, he was the owner of a house and an irregular shaped 
II 
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lot known as the family home in Brigham City, an irri-
gated farm consisting of approximately twenty eight acres 
at East Garland, a dry farm consisting of something in 
excess of four hundred acres located at Promontory, a 
second home hereinafter referred to as the Christensen 
place, and several lots in Brigham City upon which there 
were no buildings but which were cultivated. Prior to 
1943 decedent, who was a surveyor by profession, had 
executed numerous deeds to all or a portion of this prop-
erty either to his wife or daughter, or both, which said 
deeds the deceased retained in his possession. About 
March of 1943 deceased was living alone in the family 
home. His son Renee was married, had finished his law 
training and was then employed by the F.B.I. His family 
was living at South Dakota. The decedent's daughter 
Marie was married and then living in Salt Lake City 
where her husband was employed and his son George 
was then living in Brigham City in a home owned by him 
which was located on the rear end of the family lot. The 
decedent was then about sixty four years of age and he 
was in excellent health. · 
In about March of 1943, and apparently without 
consulting any members of his family, the decedent pre-
pared three deeds in his own handwriting. One deed 
named Renee and his wife as grantees and described the 
Garland property, a building lot to the rear of the family 
home (the dimensions of this lot were never described in 
the evidence) and an undivided one-third interest in the 
dry farm at Promontory. The deed to George and his wife 
described the Christensen place and one-third of the dry 
farm. The deed to defendant Marie and her husband 
12 
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described the family home (less the lot included in 
Renee's deed) and one-third interest in the dry farm. 
After the deceased had prepared these deeds he went to 
the office of his nephevv, William E. Davis, a practicing 
attorney in Brigham City, and signed the deeds as 
grantor and Mr. Davis thereupon took his acknowledg-
ment. The deceased then took the deeds and put them in 
what is referred to as the cubby hole or small compart-
ment in a roll-top desk which was in his bedroom in the 
home where he was residing. There was no reservation 
of any life estate contained in the deeds, although the 
deceased was thoroughly familiar with conveyancing and 
understood the meaning and import of a life estate. The 
deeds were never recorded. 
At about the same time the deceased likewise pre-
pared deeds to the various town lots wherein he conveyed 
the same to his grandchildren. These deeds were all re-
corded by the deceased at the time or shortly after their 
execution and thereafter the deceased would account to 
his grandchildren for crops grown on or produced upon 
their own individual lots and after deducting for taxes 
and tithing he would send the residue annually to each 
grandchild. 
With respect to the other unrecorded three deeds to 
his sons and daughter, the deceased continued to handle 
the property described in said deeds in exactly the same 
manner as he had handled them previously. He executed 
a twelve year lease to Promontory to his son in law and 
daughter. He leased the Garland farm to a Mr. Garfield 
for a period of ten years and collected the rents and in-
come therefrom. He and his brother Cephus owned ad-
13 
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joining properties at Garland and on August 22, 1948 he 
and Cephus entered into an agreement in writing aban-
doning a certain right of way and exchanging the same 
for a new right of way. See Exhibit "L-F", Tr. 147-149. 
He paid the taxes on all of the property and paid all 
expenses incident to the upkeep of said property. He 
rented the Christensen property, collected the rents there-
from, made necessary repairs for the tenant and mort-
gaged this property. In the making of the leases, mortgage 
and right of way exchange he makes no reference what-
soever to any ownership of the property other than him-
self. No reason is suggested as to why he would want to 
completely and irrevocably divest himself of all of his 
property. 
In about 1945 the deceased approached his son in 
law and daughter in Salt Lake City and suggested that his 
tenant on Promontory did not care to renew his lease be-
cause two of the lessee's sons were then in the Army and 
further suggested that he was lonesome and tired of living 
alone and suggested that they come to Brigham City, live 
in the home and take care of him and that in return he 
would lease them Promontory. A written lease for a period 
of twelve years was then executed and the defendants 
severed their employment and moved into the family 
home with the deceased and leased the Promontory dry 
farm for twelve years. 
In about I 946 the decedent suffered his first heart 
attack. Then later he had prostate trouble which required 
an operation at St. Benedict's Hospital in Ogden. Later 
on he suffered a stroke and for the period from August, 
1946 until the latter part of 1948, the deceased was very 
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ill. There were times during this period when he was 
irrational but at other times he was completely normal. 
However, the nature of his illness was such that the de-
fendants were required to constantly care for him. At 
times he lost control of his bowels and bladder and fre-
quent changes of his bed were imperative. He also had 
to have a special diet and the task of taking care of him 
became very arduous. However, about the latter part of 
1948 or the forepart of 1949 he began to improve and he 
improved steadily until very shortly before his death. He 
died June 22, 1949. 
On or about the 24th day of July, 1947 the deceased 
made a will. It was prepared by the same attorney, Wil-
liam E. Davis, and was witnessed by deceased's brother 
Cephus and his brother in law, Mr. DeMars. The will 
was quite different from the terms of the three 1943 
deeds. It provided that the d~fendants could purchase the 
Promontory farm for Ten Thousand Dollars; that this 
money was to go into the estate and that each male grand-
child was to receive One Thousand Dollars upon becom-
ing Eagle Scouts. The female grandchildren were to re-
ceive One Thousand Dollars each upon completion of 
one year of college and the balance was to go to the 
church for temple work. Renee was to have the irrigated 
farm and George, who had already received the Chris-
tensen property, ·was to get nothing. After the will was 
properly executed it was placed by the deceased with his 
other papers in his desk. 
With respect to the Christensen property, it is admit-
ted that George, after returning from the Navy, obtained 
employment_ with the Veterans' Administration in Salt 
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Lake City and was residing in a rented house at Woods 
Cross. This was in the year 1946 when George was trans-
ferred from Salt Lake City to the Weber College at Ogden 
and which necessitated the moving of his family. He tried 
to find suitable quarters in Ogden without success so he 
then discussed the matter with his father and it was de-
cided that due to his father's physical condition George 
and his wife could render some assistance along with 
Marie, so it was decided that George should have the 
Christensen home immediately and, notwithstanding the 
fact that the 1943 deed to George included the Christen-
sen home, the deceased made a new deed wherein he con-
veyed to George and his wife the Christensen home. The 
deceased prepared the deed and took it to Attorney Davis 
for acknowledgment and then he took the deed to the 
County Recorder and had it recorded and George and his 
wife then moved into the Christensen home, where they 
continued to live for a short time. This deed was dated 
November 8, 1946. See Exhibit "L-24" Tr. 228. 
Shortly thereafter George decided to homestead in 
Idaho. He sold the Christensen home and moved to the 
homestead where he remained until after his father's 
death. His disposal of this home was displeasing to the 
deceased. 
In February of 1949 the deceased sent for one John 
W. Phillips, a close friend and abstractor of long experi-
ence in Brigham City, and explained to him that he 
wanted him <Phillips) to make some deeds. Phillips came 
to the home and visited with deceased for a short time, 
obtained proper descriptions of the property and then 
returned to his office and prepared two new deeds. One 
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deed conveyed the Garland farm to Renee. The other deed 
conveyed the home and lot and the Promontory farm to 
Marie and her husband. These deeds were absolutely and 
unconditionally delivered to defendant Johnson who was 
instructed to record their deed and to hold Renee's deed 
until after the death of deceased. At the time of the exe-
cution of these deeds the deceased told Mr. Phillips that 
his son George had already received all he was entitled to. 
The defendants retained exclusive possession of these 
latter deeds but neglected to record their deed until the 
day preceding the death of deceased when they recorded 
their deed and continued to retain possession of Renee's 
deed. After decedent's death and funeral the family met 
at the office of George Mason, an attorney and also a 
cousin of the family and, at Mason's request, defendants 
delivered Renee's deed to Mason. It remained in Mason's 
office until the time of the first trial when the deed was 
tendered to Renee in open court but its acceptance was 
refused and said deed has remained in the files of the 
court since that time. 
In about March of 1949 and after the execution and 
delivery of the 1949 deeds, the deceased gathered together 
a stack of old deeds, including the 1943 deeds and the 
Will and directed Marie to bum the same as he stated 
they were no longer of any value and Marie thereupon 
and in accordance with his directions, burned said old 
documents. 
As heretofore suggested, we think the foregoing 
facts are not disputed. The controversy revolves around 
the following questions: 
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1. Were the 1943 deeds ever delivered or were 
they purely testamentary in character and fail-
ing to comply with the statute of wills, were 
they void and no force or effect? · 
2. Were the 1949 deeds delivered by deceased dur-
ing his lifetime? 
3. At the time of the 1949 deeds was the decedent 
competent to execute the same and was their 
execution obtained by fraud or undue influence 
practiced by the defendants? 
On these questions there was some conflict in the evi-
dence as to certain facts or alleged state of facts concern-
ing these matters. Plaintiffs filed this suit in the District 
Court of Box Elder County seeking to establish the valid-
ity of the 1943 deeds and to establish the invalidity of 
the 1949 deeds. The case was tried to the court with a 
jury sitting, as we understand it, in an advisory capacity. 
The first trial resulted in answers to special interroga-
tories favorable to defendants and based upon these an-
swers the court made findings of fact and conclusions of 
law and entered a decree to the effect that the 1943 deeds 
were never deliverd; that they were testamentary in char-
acter and intended as such by the deceased, and that the 
1949 deeds were valid. On an appeal to this court the 
cause was reversed solely on the ground that the trial 
court misconceived and misapplied the so-called dead 
man's statute and the case was remanded for a new trial. 
Thereafter plaintiffs applied for and were granted a 
change of venue to Cache County. The case was again 
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tried to the court with an advisory jury. The court sub-
mitted three interrogatories to the jury. The jury an-
swered these interrogatories favorable to plaintiff and 
based upon these answers, the court then entered find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and a decree establishing 
the validity of the 1943 deeds and holding that the 1949 
deeds were invalid. Defendants filed a motion for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict or in the alternative 
for a new trial. The court (with tongue in cheek) over-
ruled these motions but stated that had he been trying 
the case without a jury he would have found the issues 
in favor of the defendants (Tr. 434). Defendants have 
appealed to this court. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point I. THE ANSWER OF THE JURY TO THE 
FIRST INTERROGATORY IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE, OR, IN ANY EVENT, IT IS 
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Point 2. FINDING OF FACT NUMBER FOUR 
MADE BY THE COURT IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE, OR, IN ANY EVENT, IS 
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Point 3. THE ANSWER OF THE JURY TO INTER-
ROGATORY NUMBER THREE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL 
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EVIDENCE, OR, IN ANY EVENT, IS 
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE. 
Point 4. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBER ONE 
OF THE DECREE PERTAINING TO THE 
VALIDITY OF THE 1943 DEEDS IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE, OR, IN ANY EVENT, IS 
AGAINST THE GREAT WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE AND IS ERRONEOUS 
AND AGAINST LAW. 
Point 5. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUMBER TWO 
OF THE DECREE TO THE EFFECT 
THAT the 1949 DEEDS ARE INOPERA-
TIVE AS CONVEYANCES AND ARE IN-
VALID IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OR, IN ANY 
EVENT, IS AGAINST THE GREAT 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND IS 
ERRONEOUS AND AGAINST LAW. 
Point 6. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE WITH-
DRAWN FROM THE JURY THE ISSUE 
AS TO THE DELIVERY OF THE 1943 
DEEDS AND ALSO THE ISSUE AS TO 
MENTAL INCAPACITY OF LORENZO 
W. ANDERSON. THE COURT SHOULD 
HAVE GIVEN DEFENDANTS' RE-
QUESTED PRE-EMPTORY INSTRUC-
TION NUMBER ONE FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT, HOLDING AS A MA TIER OF 
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LAW THAT THE 1943 DEEDS WERE 
VOID AND THAT THE 1949 DEEDS 
WERE VALID. 
Point 7. THE COURT COMMITTED ERR 0 R 
BOTH AS TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN 
AND IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFEND-
ANTS. 
Point 8. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE AND IN REJECT-
ING EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY DE-
FENDANT. 
Point 9. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTER-
ING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLU-
SIONS OF LAW AND DECREE TO THE 
EFFECT THAT THE 1943 DEEDS WERE 
INVALID AND VOID AND SUSTAINING 
THE VALIDITY OF THE 1949 DEEDS. 
Point 10. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR JUDG-
MENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VER-
DICT OF THE JURY, OR, IN ANY 
EVENT, IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Point 11. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THAT PART OF FINDING NUMBER 
4-A, TRACT I, NOR THAT PART OF THE 
DECREE WHEREIN THE COURT DE-
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CREES TO PLAINTIFF LORENZO W. 
ANDERSON, JR. A PART OF LOT 1, 
BLOCK 68, PLAT "B" BRIGHAM CITY, 
BEING A TRACT DESCRIBED AS TEN 
RODS BY SIXTY-SIX FEET. 
ARGUMENT 
Points I, 2, 4 and 6 all involve the one question: 
Is the answer of the jury to the effect that the 1943 deeds 
were unconditionally delivered by grantor and the find-
ing of fact number four as made by the court, conclusion 
of law number one and the decree sustaining the validity 
of the 1943 deeds sustained by any substantial evidence? 
Also, if there is any substantial evidence as to delivery, 
does not the great weight of the evidence disprove that 
there was in law or in fact such a delivery? All of these 
points can, therefore, be grouped together. 
Appellants contend that the evidence conclusively 
shows that the so-called 1943 deeds were invalid be-
cause: 
A. They were never delivered by the grantor dur-
ing his lifetime, and 
B. They were intended as testamentary in char-
acter to take effect after death and therefore 
void because not in accordance with the re-
quirement of the statute of wills. 
It is our contention that this is an action in equity; that 
the jury was called in as advisory to the court. 
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Stanley vs. Stanley 
97 Utah, 520 
94 P. 2nd., 465 
Therefore, as stated in t~e Stanley case: 
"The scope of the review on appeal in equity 
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. This 
court is authorized by the State Constitution to 
review the findings of the trial courts in equity 
cases but the findings of the trial courts on con-
flicting evidence will not be set aside unless it 
manifestly appears that the cou.rt has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of the evidence." 
It is our contention that the trial court either mis-
applied proven facts, or, in any event, made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. We have here-
tofore set out the evidence which in our opinion is not 
disputed by either side. We shall now briefly analyze the 
evidence and the inferences reasonably deducible there-
from with respect to the question of the alleged delivery 
of these deeds. 
Plaintiffs, to prove delivery, reply principally Upon 
statements alleged to have been made by the deceased to 
the grantees subsequent to the execution of the deeds. 
No one else was present so of course there is no way to 
directly deny this testimony. However, in attempting to 
analyze the evidence, and particularly th€ weight of the 
evidence, this testimony, coming as it does from the 
mouth of the plaintiffs themselves, should be carefully 
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scrutinized. Renee does not claim that his deed was ever 
delivered to him personally. He contends it was delivered 
to Marie to be held by her. Renee testified he received a 
letter from his father in the Spring of 1943. At that time 
he was a lawyer and was employed by the F.B.I. The 
records in this case indicate that he very carefully pre-
served every letter which was written to him by his sis-
ter Marie; but, he was unable to produce this important 
letter from his father. His explanation for its loss is far 
from satisfactory,· especially in view of his meticulous 
care in preserving all other correspondence. His training 
as a lawyer should suggest the importance of preserving 
this letter and also his special training as an investigator. 
He was permitted to state the substance of this letter as 
he now remembers it after some nine years from the time 
it was alleged to have been written. He testified that his 
father stated: 
"I have deeded the property to you." Tr. 87. 
It is true deceased had signed a deed which on its face 
purported to deed this property to Renee. There is no-
thing iri this letter which says or infers that the deed had 
been irrevocably delivered or which even intimates that it 
was not testamentary in character. Nor does the letter 
make any reference to the fact, if it was a fact, that the 
writer had delivered the deed to Marie for delivery to him 
upon death. 
Much evidence was offered by Plaintiffs to show 
how meticulous their lather was in all his business deal-
ings. He was a surveyor by profession and had prepared 
many deeds. He was also an abstractor. It is very signifi-
cant that with this kind of a background the deceased 
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made no mention of where the deed was placed or what 
was to be done with ~t. Had he delivered it to his daugh-
ter Marie to in turn deliver to Renee, it is most likely that 
he would have so stated in the letter. It is also very sig-
nificant that for some reason he did not forward the deed 
itself to Renee. If the deceased intended a present uncon-
ditional delivery as contended by plaintiffs and if he had 
the confidence in his children that he was willing to 
accept the assurance that he was to have a life estate in 
the property (not reserved in the deed) and that they 
would not record the deeds until after his death, it seems 
pretty hard to understand why he retained the deeds in 
his own possession and under his own control. The an-
swer is obvious. At that time he was making conveyances 
testamentary with no thought of delivering the deeds 
except in case of death. 
Renee testified he again saw his Dad in October of 
1944; that his Dad remarked he had "made deeds giving 
us the property." Tr. 87. It is significant that at this time 
Renee had never seen the deeds. So far as the evidence 
discloses he had never discussed the question of whether 
a life estate was reserved in the deeds; yet, Renee says that 
he said to his Dad: 
"I think you are making a mistake by giving title 
without reserving a life estate." 
How did Renee know there was no life estate reserved? 
His testimony fails to disclose that up to this time, either 
in the purported letter or in the conversation, had his Dad 
made any statement concerning a life estate. His state-
ment was: 
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"I have deeded you the property." 
Yet, out of nowhere Renee tells his.father he is making a 
mistake in not reserving a life estate. Renee testified fur-
ther that his father said: 
"I trust you three children. I know you are not 
going to record the deeds until I die and that you 
are going to let me have the property to keep the 
proceeds from it." Tr. 87. 
If he was so trusting, why didn't he deliver possession of 
the deeds to· the grantees at this time? The answer is 
obvious. He had no intention of presently conveying the 
property. Notwithstanding his meticulous habits and 
training, if he did not want to reserve a life estate in the 
deed itself, as testified by Renee, Tr. 87, why didn't he 
have the grantees sign a separate instrument agreeing 
not to record the deeds until after his death and agreeing 
that he might enjoy the rents and income from the prop-
erty during his lifetime? Such a procedure would have 
been very easy to have accomplished and meticulous men 
act meticulously on matters of such vital concern. 
Renee further testified that: 
"Dad told me my deed was in the home. He said 
he had given it to Marie to be given to me." 
The facts are that Marie was living in Salt Lake City at 
that time. She did not come to Brigham City to live in 
the family home until sometime in 1945. There is no 
scintilla of evidence that these deeds ever left deceased's 
desk. If he delivered this deed to Marie to hold, when and 
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how was it done? Marie denied that he had ever delivered 
Renee's deed to her. The facts strongly refute Renee's 
statement. Tr. 87-88. It is also interesting to note that 
Renee made two trips to Brigham City-one in June of 
1945. Tr. 91-92, and again in June of 1946. On each of 
these occasions Renee and Marie, unbeknown to their 
father, went into his room, opened his desk and took out 
these deeds so that Renee could check them over, and, 
after doing so, they were put back in the father's desk. 
Renee did not reveal to his father the fact that he had 
examined the deeds. He did not discuss the matter with 
him. If the deed had been previously unconditionally 
delivered and if he had had several previous talks with his 
father about the same, it seems passing strange that on a 
visit to the family home he would not have asked his 
father's permission to see the deeds and discuss the mat-
ter with him in the presence of Marie. 
Now with respect to George's deed: he testified he 
first learned about the 1943 deeds in the middle or latter 
part of March, 1943 (a month or more after they were 
executed) although he lived only a stone's throw from his 
father's home and saw him nearly every day. He further 
testified that he and his wife had the deceased over to 
supper nearly every night and on one evening his Dad 
casually mentioned that he had made some deeds and, 
"wanted us to come back and take care of them." 
Tr. 219. 
That after dinner they went down to the house together 
and there were three deeds lying spread out on the desk. 
Tr. 220. It may seem trivial but how did those deeds get 
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spread out on the table. Did deceased get them out of his 
desk and spread them out on the table before he went up 
to dinner? The evidence is that they all returned together 
to the home and there the deeds were spread out on the 
table. He then testified to a sort of "laying on of hands" 
ceremony indulged in between Father and Son and then 
the Father said: 
"I am giving you this deed with the understand-
ing that I would like to have the revenues from 
my property as long as I live. Now you can record 
this deed if you want to but I wish you wouldn't 
until after I die. I would like you three children to 
come and get your deeds together. Each of you 
will then know what the other is getting so that 
there will be no feelings." 
This also seems a rather strange situation. At the home 
deceased had stated he wanted George to come back and 
take care of his deed. He then shows him the deed, has 
him lay his hands on it and then he takes it back and puts 
it in his own desk. His explanation seems flimsy that: 
"each of you will know what the other is getting 
so there will be no feelings." 
when each one contends that he already knew what he 
was getting. If there were to be any feelings they should 
have arisen when they learned of the contents of the 
deed and not after the death of the father. 
There is another significant fact in connection with 
George's deed which has already been referred to. In 
1946 when George was returning to Brigham City to 
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live, his father made a deed to the Christensen place. He 
took the deed to the County Recorder's office and had it 
recorded. If George already owned the property by rea-
son of the 1943 deeds, why should he make another deed 
again conveying the property to George and why did he 
record that deed but not record the others? Here again 
the answer is obvious. Deceased intended to presently 
give George the Christensen place. He did not consider 
the 1943 deeds of any value during his lifetime while the 
same were being held in his own possession. He, there-
fore, gave him a deed to the Christensen property and had 
it recorded because he intended to presently convey this 
property to George. 
The only other evidence as to delivery consists of 
statements allegedly made to Ellis L. DeMars, a brother 
in law, and Edna Anderson DeMars, a sister. His alleged 
statement to Ellis L. DeMars to the effect that he was 
going to make out deeds to take care o_f all of his children 
and a later statement to the effect that he had made deeds 
and that George will have the Christensen property as 
well as the other add nothing to the question at issue. 
There is no question but what at the time these deeds 
were signed the deceased did intend that upon his death 
the property should be distributed in accordance with 
the terms of these deeds. 
Let us now consider the evidence and reasonable 
, inferences to be deduced therefrom, which we contend 
points clearly to the conclusion that these so-called 1943 
deeds were never delivered by the Grantor and were in-
tended by him to be testamentary in character. It has 
been frequently stated that the question of delivery re-
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solves itself into a question of the intent on the part of 
the Grantor, and that it is a question of law or fact or 
both to determine the intent of the Grantor at the time 
of the alleged delivery. However, as the court frequently 
states "Actions speak louder than words," and this is 
particularly true when the words come from the mouths 
of interested parties under circumstances where it is im-
possible to refute the statements alleged to have been 
made by the Grantor by reason of his subsequent death. 
What facts and inferences determinable therefrom 
are either admitted or are undisputed facts in this case? 
I. In 1943 when the deeds were signed the Grantor 
was 64 years of age, living alone in his own home. He 
was in excellent health, self-supporting and his children 
were all married and living separate and apart from him. 
They had all received college training. These deeds, if 
legally delivered, would have divested the deceased of 
practically all of his property. There is no suggestion in 
the evidence as to any reasons why the deceased would 
at that time have intended by the signing of these deeds 
to completely divest himself of all of his property. 
2. Notwithstanding the claimed deliveries the deeds 
at all times subsequent thereto were under the complete 
control and domination of the Grantor. He never at any 
time parted with the physical possession of either Ren-
nie's or Marie's deeds, and while George claims to have 
had possession of his deed for a short time, yet he re-
turned the Promontory deed, after it was claimed to have 
been executed in 1946, back to his father. 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Notwithstanding the signing of the deeds, the 
Grantor continued to exercise complete dominion and 
control over the property to the same extent as he had 
done prior to the signing of the deeds. He remained in 
possession of the property, collected the rents and income 
therefrom, paid the taxes and upkeep for necessary re-
pairs to the same extent as though he was still the owner 
of the property. 
4. In addition to paying the taxes and costs of re-
pairs for making the necessary improvements he leased 
the Promontory farm to Marie and her husband for a 
period of 12 years. This lease contains no intimation or 
suggestion that he was not the sole and complete owner of 
said property. No mention is made in the lease that he 
had anything less than the absolute fee. 
5. Likewise he leased the Garland farm to one Gar-
field for a period of years under similar conditions. 
6. He negotiated with his brother Cephus with re-
spect to surrendering a right-of-way across the Garland 
property and accepted in lieu thereof a new right-of-way. 
7. He invited and solicited the defendants to give up 
their employment in Salt Lake City and to come to the 
home and live there with him. 
8. At no time did he ever consult with the Grantees 
in respect to any of these matters. 
9. In 1947 he executed a will which was entirely in-
consistent with any idea or suggestion that he was not 
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then the complete owner of the property. It may be sug-
gested by the plaintiffs that at the time this will was 
prepared he was mentally incompetent; however, it is 
clearly established that the will was prepared by a com-
petent attorney and his own nephew, William E. Davis. 
This will was witnessed by his brother Cephus and also 
by his brother-in-law Ellis DeMars, the man who testi-
fied in this case as to his mental condition. It is incon-
ceivable that Attorney Davis would participate in the 
execution of a will by an incompetent person, and it is 
hardly likely that a brother and brother-in-law would 
witness a will if in their opinion the facts were contrary 
to the attestation clause. 
10. In 1949 he signed new deeds and, absent the 
question of mental capacity hereinafter to be discussed, 
this was the strongest kind of evidence of lack of intent 
to deliver the '43 deeds. 
11. Rennie and Marie, on two separate occasions 
without consulting the Grantor, went to his desk, took 
out the deeds, examined them and put them back in the 
Grantor's desk. 
12. These deeds were never recorded, although deeds 
to his grandchildren, which he apparently intended as a 
present conveyance, were all recorded by the Grantor 
himself. 
13. In 1946 George wanted to return to Brigham 
City. The Grantor owned the Christensen home, which 
was included in the '43 deeds. He decided that he would 
give George the Christensen home, so he prepared at 
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least one new deed wherein he conveyed the Christensen 
home to George. He immediately took this deed to the 
County Recorder's Office and had it recorded, and George 
went into the possession of the home. Shortly after he 
sold the home and moved to Idaho. George testified that 
at the same time he executed a new deed conveying to 
George a one-third interest in Promontory. If he did, then 
he retained this deed in his exclusive possession. 
14. While George claims to have had the possession 
of the '43 deeds for a short time prior to the execution of 
these second deeds in 1946, the possession was only tem-
porary in order to permit him to eject the tenant from 
the Christensen home, and after this was accomplished 
and he got possession· he returned the deed to his father. 
15. When deceased learned that George had sold 
the Christensen property he was very much upset. If he 
thought that he had already deeded the home to George 
· and if he did not want to record the deed there is no rea-
son why he needed to make a new deed to the Christensen 
property. Under plaintiffs' theory George was already the 
absolute owner of this property. 
16. He conveyed the unimproved small lots to his 
grandchildren. These deeds he promptly recorded. There-
after he treated this property as belonging to the grand-
children. He accounted to them for any income, after 
taxes and tithing, which was derived from these lots. 
17. His acts and conduct show conclusively that 
whenever he intended to pass immediate title he believed 
it necessary to record the deeds. On the other hand when 
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he wanted to make the deeds testamentary in character 
he retained the same and changed them at pleasure as 
subsequent conditions warranted. 
18. He mortgaged the Christensen property after 
the execution of the '43 deeds. 
We contend that in view of the foregoing the ques-
tion of delivery became a question of law rather than of 
fact (See 26 C. J. S. page 256, Section 52). 
We will first cite the Utah cases which have had 
occasion to discuss the question of delivery or lack of 
delivery. 
Singleton vs. Kelly 
61 Utah, 277 
212 P. 63 
Mower vs. Mower 
64 Utah, 260 
228 P. 911 
First Security Trust Company vs. 
Tracy Loan 
96 Utah, 148 
84 P2d. 414 
First Security Bank of Utah, 
Administrator of the estate 
of Alfred Burgi, deceased vs. 
Clyde Burgi, et al. 
P2d. 
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Each of these cases discuss the question of delivery or 
lack of delivery. 
While it is admitted that some of these acts and 
conducts standing alone might be consistent with an 
intent of immediate delivery, yet when you have the 
combination of all of these facts which point unerringly 
to a lack of intent, we contend that as a matter of law 
there was no intent to make a present delivery of these 
deeds. 
It is, of course, impe>ssible to cite the many, many 
cases dealing with this question; however, we shall cite 
a few cases from neighboring states which we think are 
controlling. 
Fisher vs. Oliver 
164 P. 801 
Here the trial court found a delivery. The Supreme Court 
reversed the decision, which is equivalent to holding 
there was no evidence of delivery. The decision is based 
primarily on the fact that the Grantor retained possession 
of the deeds and was therefore in a, positio~ to destroy 
them at his pleasure. 
Barnes vs. Spangler 
25 P2d. 732 
In this case the equities in favor of a delivery were very 
strong. The trial court held that the deeds were delivered 
but the appellate court reversed the trial court. 
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Roberts vs. McCoach 
65 P2d. 289 
In this case the court says "The delivery of a deed is 
largely a matter of intention as shown by all of the facts 
and circumstances. To establish delivery it must appear 
that the deed passed beyond the control of the Grantor. 
One who executes a deed to property he owns and re-
tains possession of the deed until his death dies in full 
ownership of the property." 
Citing cases. 
Hayes vs. Moffet 
271 P. 433 
Here the deed was placed in a can which was accessible 
to both Grantor and Grantee, but the court held this fact 
to be immaterial. In this case as in ours the Grantee 
claimed that the Grantor reserved a life estate by parole, 
but the appellate court held that such a life estate could 
only be created by a written instrument. The court held 
there was no delivery. 
Butler vs. Butler 
32 P2d. 54 
This is an interesting case because the factual situation is 
somewhat comparable to our own. The Grantor first 
made four deeds to his four heirs. He later made a second 
deed. The question was whether or not the first four deeds 
were ever delivered. The court held they were not. The 
court says "It is not necessary that a delivery of a deed 
should be made to the Grantee himself, but it will be suf-
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ficient if it is delivered to a third person for the use of 
the Grantee. Such a delivery, however, will not be effec-
tual unless it is made in such a way that the Grantor 
parts with all control of the instrument." The court then 
quotes from decisions of other states and then says that 
the above text settles the rule without qualification. 
Witham vs. Witham 
66 P2d. 281 
In discussing the question of delivery the court says "In 
order to constitute a valid deed it is· essential that the 
deed be delivered, and to constitute a deliver ythe Grantor 
must part with control over it and retain no right to .re-
claim or recall it. It is shown by the record that Elaine 
Witham, after signing the ded, retained possession of the 
land during the rest of his lifetime, held possession and 
dominion of the deed, never delivered the same to the 
defendant or authorized such delivery, and had the right 
to cancel the deed just as he had the right to change his 
will; and the evidence strongly shows he attempted to 
have the deed cancelled by directing his wife to destroy 
the same." 
This latter statement impels us to interject one other 
strong bit of evidence of non-delivery. The record stands 
undisputed that after signing the 1949 deeds the Grantor 
went to his desk, went through all of his deeds and the 
will and directed Marie to burn the same as they were no 
longer of any force. 
There !s a comprehensive note found in 44 L. R. A. 
-N.S. commencing at page 528 Annotated in the case of 
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Butts vs. Richards 
140 N. W. 1 
and particularly the annotation commencing on page 536 
under the heading "Evidence Not Sufficient to Overcome 
Presumption of Non-Delivery." 
Taylor vs. Taylor 
247 P. 174 
is also a very good case discussing this question. 
In re Cunningham 
64 F2d. 296 
Here the court says "The fundamental rule is that deliv-
ery is essential to the validity of a deed as the final act 
which consummates it, and delivery does not take place 
until the deed passes out of the control of the Grantor 
and into the actual or constructive control of the Grantee." 
The subject is fully and comprehensively discussed 
in 23 C. J. S. commencing at page 231 and extending to 
page 252. Appellant contends therefore that the evidence 
of non-delivery and of intent to make a testamentary dis-
position is so strong that this court should find non-de-
livery as a matter of law. That if we are in error, yet this 
being an equitable case, the evidence of non-delivery is so 
overwhelming that this court should hold that the finding 
of delivery is not sustained by the evidence. 
POINTS 2, 3 AND 5 
These points 2, 3 and 5 deal with the question of 
whether or not there was any evidence to submit to the 
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jury on the question of the Grantor's alleged incompe-
tency at the time he executed the 1949 deeds. We recog-
nize, of course, that if the 1943 deeds were delivered then 
the 1949 deeds would be inoperative, and to a certain 
extent the question of the competency of the deceased 
would be immaterial; however as dealing with the ques-
tion of non-delivery the competency of the deceased when 
he admittedly executed the 1949 deeds is very material. If, 
as the jury found, the deceased was incompetent when he 
signed the '49 deeds, then of course his signing of these 
deeds would be no evidence of intent as to delivery of the 
'43 deeds. If on the other hand he was competent when he 
signed the '49 deeds, then the execution of these subse-
quent deeds is very strong evidence of lack of intent to 
deliver the '43 deeds. 
We contend therefore that the court was in error in 
submitting to the jury Interrogatory Number 3 and we 
contend further that the court should have granted de-
fendants' motion to withdraw any issue of mental capa-
city from the jury, which motion was made at the con-
clusion of plaintiffs' case. (See Tr. 311 and at the conclu-
sion of the case Tr. 426-427). 
The answers of the jury to Interrogatories Number 
2 and Number 3 are inconsistent. The jury answered 2 
that the '49 deeds were delivered, then by answer Num-
ber 3 they found that he was mentally incompetent. Of 
course if the deeds were delivered he was not incompetent. 
We contend, however, that there is not a scintilla of 
evidence in this whole record which discloses that the de-
ceased was incompetent at the time he signed the 1949 
deeds. 
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John W. Phillips, a disinterested witness, an ab-
stractor of years of experience in conveyancing and a 
long friend and associate of the family, testified positively 
that on the day of the execution of the '49 deeds that the 
deceased was in full possession of his mental faculties. 
His testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Dr. 
Moskowitz. This positive evidence cannot be disregarded 
or disbelieved, in the absence at least of some evidence to 
the contrary. We say there is absolutely no evidence 
which in any way disputes the evidence of Mr. Phillips 
and the Doctor. 
The witness, Ellis DeMars, testified at considerable 
length concerning the mental condition of the deceased. 
It is not disputed that at times during the years from 
'46 to '48 that the deceased had periods of incapacity, 
and much of the testimony of the plaintiffs related to this 
period of time. All witnesses agreed that the deceased im-
proved steadily for several months prior to his death. In 
answer to a question Mr. Ellis stated that he could not 
remember dates very well, but "deceased was well and up 
and around in pretty good shape during the months of 
April and May of 1949." <Tr. 273), and that prior to 
April and May "he was just up and down." <Tr. 274). 
"That about the first of the year 1949 he was very weak 
and, of course, he was sitting up at times." He talked 
with him frequently. 
Then the witness DeMars related some instances 
which occurred subsequent to the execution of the deed 
wherein he related how he took the deceased on several 
trips. In each instance he stated that when he came to 
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the house the deceased was rational but that after he had 
taken him for a ride the effects of the riding seemed to 
affect him, and he would get a funny stare, and so he 
would take him home. Certainly this is no evidence that 
he was irrational when he signed these deeds iri Febru-
ary of I949. 
Had the court withdrawn from the jury any ques-
tion of incompetency and had the court instructed the 
jury that there was no evidence of incompetency when he 
signed the '49 deeds, this fact alone might have influ-
enced the answer of the jury on Interrogatory Number I. 
Apparently for some reason the jury completely disre-
garded the evidence and found that when he signed the 
'49 deeds deceased was incompetent. Finding that to be 
a fact, of course, would nullify the effect of the subsequent 
execution of these deeds as it related to the question of 
whether the decedent intended to deliver the '43 deeds. 
Failure of the court to withdraw this issue from the jury 
constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT 7. THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
BOTH AS TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN AND IN RE-
FUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED 
BY DEFENDANT. 
The court's instruction No. I is needless and con-
fusing. We do not know what the court meant by the 
language "that a deed just passes a present interest" and 
when read in connection with the rest of Instruction No. 
I, it seems to be more confusing than anything else and 
seems to minimize the effect of a deed. 
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In Instruction No.2, the first interrogatory is ambig-
uous and uncertain, in this, that the court uses the lan-
guage "were ever delivered". The court should have added 
to this language "were ever delivered" the following, 
"either to the grantees or to some person authorized to 
accept delivery for the grantee". 
The balance of Instruction No. 2 may be a correct 
statement of the law but like to many stock instructions, 
it fails to tell the jury what acts or conduct they might 
consider in determining whether or not the grantor did 
in fact intend to make a present irrevocable delivery of 
the deed. 
Defendants, by their requested Instruction No. 7, 
specifically outlined to the jury certain facts which, had 
the court given this instruction, the jury would have been 
told what to consider in determining whether or not 
there was a present intent to deliver the deeds. The court 
refused to give this request, or any instruction embodying 
the same. 
In Instruction No. 3, the court, in outlining the 
issues, states: 
"that each of the aforementioned deeds was de-
livered to Marie Johnson by the deceased as the 
agent of each of the grantees named therein." 
This is an incorrect statement of the pleadings which 
alleged that Renee's deed was delivered to Marie but not 
George's deed. 
In Instruction No. 4, the court says: 
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"and the fact that one of the 1949 deeds was actu-
ally recorded one day prior to· deceased's death, 
while a significant fact, is not controlling on the 
question of delivery one way or another in this 
case but evidence is to be awarded such value and 
weight as you may deem proper." 
This we believe is an incorrect statement of the law. The 
fact that a deed is recorded during the lifetime of the 
grantor creates a presumption that the deed was delivered 
by the grantor and the court should have so instructed 
the jury. The court should have given defendants' re-
quested Instruction No. 9 which we believe to be a cor-
rect statement of the law. 
There is no evidence to permit the giving of Instruc-
tion No. 7 with respect to the competency of the grantor 
when he executed the 1949 deeds. The giving of this in-
struction constituted prejudicial error. The court should 
have given defendant's requested Instruction No. 2 and 
No.4. 
Point 8. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
CERTAIN EVIDENCE AND IN REJECTING EVI-
DENCE PROFFERED BY THE DEFENDANTS. 
The court, over the objection of defendants, permit-
ted the witness Renee to relate conversations which took 
place between the plaintiffs and the defendants after the 
funeral of their father. Tr. 111-112. What was said by 
the alleged grantees after the death of the grantor was 
incompetent as it could shed no light on the question of 
the intent of the grantor when he signed the deeds, and 
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furthermore, this alleged conversation clearly related to 
family discussions which were in the nature of compro-
mises. For example, the statement alleged to have been 
made by Mr. Johnson to the effect that he felt the farm 
was worth about Ten Thousand Dollars and he men-
tioned again that he didn't know whether he was inter-
ested in the continuing of the operation of it or not be-
cause he didn't think there was enough land to justify 
his farming it and that if he stayed he would like to 
acquire more land, certainly was incompetent and preju-
dicial. It was incompetent because it had nothing to do 
with the question of whether or not the deeds were deliv-
ered. Then the witness volunteered the statement: 
"Chet said he had a good notion to leave Marie 
and the kids and get the Hell out of there". Tr. 
112. 
While the court struck this answer, it left a marked im-
pression upon the jury. In fact, throughout the entire 
testimony evidence was offered by plaintiffs which was 
calculated to and which did prejudice this jury. 
The court permitted the plaintiffs to give statements 
alleged to have been made by Dr. Moskowitz. See Tr. 
111-116. Certainly what Dr. Moskowitz might have said 
at a family discussion would not be binding upon either 
the plaintiffs or the defendants. It was offered by plain-
tiffs for the purpose of attempting to prove that Dr. Mos-
kowitz in some way was aligned with defendants in an 
attempt to conceal the true facts. 
The court also permitted the plaintiffs to relate 
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alleged statements made by George N. Mason in the 
presence of the plaintiffs and the defendants. The evi-
dence shows that George N. Mason was a cousin of the 
parties; that the plaintiffs suggesting a meeting at his 
office for the purpose of attempting to settle and compro-
mise their differences. What George N. Mason may have 
said in this meeting was incompetent and it was only 
offered for the purpose of attempting to prejudice the 
jury. See also Tr. 196. 
The court permitted the plaintiff to cross examine 
the defendant Johnson with respect to the value of the 
home property. Tr. 412-415. This was also incompetent 
and highly prejudicial. The plaintiffs had put on expert 
witnesses as to the value of the property. Their evidence 
was not disputed. The purpose of the cross examination 
was calculated to prejudice the jury against the de-
fendants. 
Over the objection of the defendants the court per-
mitted the plaintiff to introduce. in evidence plaintiffs' 
Exhibit "L-5". It was claimed by plaintiffs' counsel that 
it was offered to impeach the doctor. If offered for that 
purpose, it certainly should have been offered in connec-
tion with the cross examination of Dr. Moskowitz so that 
he would have an opportunity of explaining the same, 
but, instead of that, after the doctor is released and not 
available, this Exhibit is introduced upon the statement 
of counsel that it impeached the testimony of the doctor. 
This was certainly improper and was highly prejudicial. 
The Exhibit itself was improper as no proper foundation 
had been laid for the introduction of the certificate. 
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Point 9. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ENTER-
ING FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE 1943 
DEEDS WERE INVALID AND VOID AND SUSTAIN-
ING THE VALIDITY OF THE 1949 DEEDS. 
We have heretofore discussed Point Nine but we 
desire to make this further observation: It is our position 
that the court should have held as a matter of law that 
the 1943 deeds were undelivered and were testamentary 
in character and therefore invalid, and had the court so 
ruled, then it is our position that there was no evidence 
to submit to the jury, nor was there any evidence to sus-
tain findings and judgment decreeing the 1949 deeds to 
be invalid. 
Point 10. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANT-
ING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
N01WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OF THE 
JURY, OR, IN ANY EVENT, IN DENYING DEFEND-
ANTS' MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
This raises a most interesting situation. As we have 
heretofore suggested, this being an equity suit, this court 
has the duty to review the evidence and to determine 
whether or not the findings are clearly against the weight 
of the evidence. The same duty evolves upon the trial 
court. When a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict was filed, it became the duty of the court to 
search the record and if the Judge is of the opinion that 
the verdict is clearly and palpably against the weight of 
the evidence, then the court should grant the motion, or, 
in any event, grant the motion for a new trial. See the 
following Utah cases: 
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Valiotis vs. Utah-Apex Mining Company 
55, Utah, 151 
184 Pac., 802 
King vs. Utah Power and Railway Company 
Utah 
212 P. 2nd., 692 
Jenson vs. Logan City 
89 Utah, 347 
57 P. 2nd., 708 
Utah State National Bank vs. Livingston 
69 Utah, 784 
254 Pac., 781 
Thompson vs. Owen Livestock Company 
74 Utah, 1 
276 Pac. 651 
Greco vs. Gentile 
88 Utah, 255 
53 P. 2nd, I 155 
Bowers vs. Gray 
99 Utah, 336 
106 P. 2nd., 765 
Saltas vs. Affleck 
99 Utah, 381 
105 P. 2nd., 176 
Crellin vs. Thomas 
Utah 
247 P. 2nd., 264 
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The trial court, in denying the motions, said: 
"If this were a trial to the court only, the court 
would have not hesitation in directing findings in 
favor of the girl Marie. There is no doubt in my 
mind from what experience I have had where I 
sit without a jury such would be the finding." 
Tr. 434. 
This is equivalent to saying that the trial court in his 
own mind had no doubt but what the verdict of the jury 
was wrong but the jury had found otherwise and he·felt 
compelled to follow the verdict of the jury. The court 
completely overlooked the fact that the jury was merely 
advisory . to the court and that the court was under the 
duty to make findings in accord with the greater weight 
of the evidence and he certainly failed to follow the ad-
monition of this court as set out in the V aliotis case 
which reads as follows: 
"It is undoubtedly true, as counsel for appellant 
contend, that the trial judge may and should set 
aside a verdict for insufficiency of the evidence 
and grant a new trial, whenever in his judgment 
the verdict is clearly and palpably against the 
weight of the evidence. Not to do so would be an 
abuse of his discretion." 
In the light of the court's own statement, we submit that 
it was a clear abuse of his discretion on the part of the 
trial court to deny plaintiff's motion for a new trial when 
the court clearly felt that the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence was against this verdict. 
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Point 11. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THAT PART OF FINDING NUMBER 4-A, 
TRACT I, NOR THAT PART OF THE DECREE 
WHEREIN THE COURT DECREES TO PLAINTIFF 
LORENZO W. ANDERSON, JR. A PART DF LOT I, 
BLOCK 68, PLAT "B" BRIGHAM CITY, BEING A 
TRACT DESCRIBED AS TEN RODS BY SIXTY SIX 
FEET. 
In finding number 4-A, Tract 1., the court finds that 
the deceased executed a warranty deed to plaintiffs Lo-
renzo W. Anderson and wife to the following described 
property located in Box Elder County, Utah: 
Tract I. Beginning at the Southeast Corner of· 
Lot I, Block 68, Plat "B", Brigham City ·~urvey,. 
and running thence West IO Rods; thence North 
66 feet; thence East I 0 Rods; thence South 66 
feet, more or less to the place of· beginning 
and.in the decree the court adjudged them to be the own-
ers of this property. We have searched this record in vain 
for any evidence upon which the court could base this 
finding and judgment. The evidence of the plaintiff was 
that there was included in the I943 deeds a building lot. 
However, the size and dimensions of this lot were never 
mentioned. While of course we cannot introduce evidence 
at this late date, yet, for the purpose of argument only, 
may I suggest that if this description is sustained, the 
West line of Renee's property will pass completely 
through the center of one of the buildings on the lot con-
veyed to the defendant Marie. The mere fact that the 
deed convyed a building lot in· the Southeast corner of 
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the lot does not justify the court, in the absence of any 
evidence, to arbitrarily quiet title to a tract of land ten 
rods in depth by four rods in width. We challenge counsel 
for respondents to point out any evidence in this volum-
inous record from which the court could make such a 
finding or decree. 
CONCLUSION 
Summarizing, appellants contend: 
I. That the granting of the motion for a change of venue 
was prejudicial to the rights of the defendants and con-
stituted reversible error. 
2. That the evidence discloses as a matter of law that the 
1943 deeds were never devilered, but, on the contrary, 
that they were intended to be merely testamentary in 
character. 
3. That if there is any evidence to go to the jury as to 
delivery, it manifestly appears that the trial court has 
misapplied proven facts or has made findings clearly 
against the weight of the evidence in this case. 
t. That if the 1943 deeds were invalid, this court should 
reverse the trial court with instructions to enter a 
decree validating the 1949 deeds for the following 
reasons: 
(A) That the evidence of delivery of these deeds to-
gether with the recordation of Marie's deed prior 
to death is conclusively established. 
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(B) There is no evidence that the deceased at the time 
he executed the 1949 deeds was mentally in-
competent. 
On this question of mental incompetency, we shall con-
tent ourselves by citing the leading Utah case, 
In re: Hansen's Will 
50 Utah, 207 
167 Pac. 256 
Second Appeal: 
52 Utah, 554 
177 Pac. 982 
In · re: Hansen's Estate 
87 Utah, 580 
52 P. 2nd., 1103 
(C) That in any event the decree awarding plaintiff 
Renee a lot specifically described as being sixty 
six feet by ten rods cannot be sustained because 
there is no evidence to support said finding and 
decree. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LE ROY B. YOUNG of 
YOUNG, THATCHER 
& GLASMANN 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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